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    <title>Cve on *scratch*</title>
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    <description>Recent content in Cve on *scratch*</description>
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      <title>Hide the current process executable file</title>
      <link>https://www.scrivano.org/posts/2022-12-21-hide-self-exe/</link>
      <pubDate>Wed, 21 Dec 2022 22:15:00 +0200</pubDate>
      <guid>https://www.scrivano.org/posts/2022-12-21-hide-self-exe/</guid>
      <description>&lt;p&gt;I have been working on a new functionality for the &lt;code&gt;prctl&lt;/code&gt; syscall that addresses a common security concern with container runtimes. The &lt;code&gt;/proc/self/exe&lt;/code&gt; symlink, which points to the executable of the running process, was the key ingredient in CVE-2019-5736, a vulnerability that allowed a malicious container to overwrite the container runtime binary on the host. The workaround deployed at the time — re-execing from a copy or using a read-only bind mount — treats the symptom rather than the cause.&lt;/p&gt;</description>
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